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CONTRACEPTIVE STERILIZATION: THE DOCTOR, THE
PATIENT, AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

Voluntary contraceptive sterilization is a 20th century phenomenon. The
female procedure, salpingectomy, was first performed by a Swiss surgeon in
1897,3 while the male procedure of vasectomy developed in America. 2 Although first introduced into the American legal scene as a compulsory measure
for sterilization of mental defectives,3 these procedures- have recently become
popular as a voluntary method of contraception.
Prior to 1970 approximately 100,000 voluntary sterilizations were performed annually,5 the majority of which were for family planning purposes.6
In 1970 the reported number of operations increased to 900,000. 7 This sudden increase in the number of operations has been attributed to the growing
popularity of the simple procedure of vasectomy.8 However, the failure rate of
other methods of contraception 9 coupled with recent medical disclosures of

1. J. FLETCrHR,
MORALS AND MEDICINE 144 (1960).
2. Id. It was perfected by Dr. H. C. Sharp, official physician at the Indiana State
Reformatory. Sharp performed the operation on boys in the reformatory, without authorizing legislation, from 1899 until 1907 when Indiana passed a eugenic statute. Id.
8. The term accorded this type of sexual sterilization is "eugenic." Sir Francis Galton
coined the word in 1883 and defined it as "the study of agencies under social control that
may improve or impair . . . future generations whether physically or mentally." Fester,
Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 22 OHxO ST. L.J. 591 (1968).
Although earlier attempts were made to enact eugenic statutes, Indiana became the
first state to successfully enact a compulsory sterilization law in 1907. Kindregan, Sixty
Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three Generations of Imbeciles" and the
Constitution of the United States, 43 Cm.-KENT L. Rzv. 128 (1966). However, it was not
until 1927 that the United States Supreme Court found compulsory sterilization to be constitutional. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Since this note is concerned with voluntary
contraceptive sterilization there will be no further discussion of eugenic sterilization.
4. Sexual sterilization as discussed in this note refers to the surgical procedures of
vasectomy on the male and tubal ligation or coagulation (salpingectomy) on the female.
Vasectomy is a simple procedure in which the vas deferens, the tubes that transport
sperm from the testes, are cut and tied. See J. F=.irrcsM, supra note 1. Salpingectomy, however, is in most cases a more involved operation in which the Fallopian tubes are either
cut and tied or clips are attached causing blockage or the tubes are burned electrically
causing coagulation and blockage. Id. Black, Sterilization by Laparascopic Tubal Electrocoagulation: An Assessment, 111 Amr. J. OBrrurscs & GYNECOLOGY 979 (1971). Recent developments in instruments and techniques are rendering salpingectomy a more simple
and inexpensive procedure. Similar to vasectomy, a local anesthetic is being successfully used.
See Siegler, An Instrument To Aid Tubal Serilization by Laparascopy, 28 FaRTnrv & STERanrrY 367 (1972). Additionally, operations are now being conducted on an outpatient basis in
some localities. Female Sterilization on Outpatient Basis Succeeds in Miami, 7 OBsrzmxcVAL
GYNECOLOGY Naws, April 15, 1972, at 4.
5. Gonzales, Voluntary Sterilization,70 Am. J. NURSING 2581 (1970).
6. See D. Mv ms, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAw 4 (1970).
7. See Davis, Vasectomy, 72 AM. J. NURSING 509 (1972); Vasectomies Multiplying, 7
OBsTERcAL GYNECOLOGY NEws, April 15, 1972, at 6.
8. Of the 1970 operations 700,000 were vasectomies. Davis, supra note 7, at 509.
9. See G. WttuAMS, THE SANC'rrY OF LEM AND THE CRrmiNAL LAw 78-80 (1959); Edey,
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the harmful side effects of the birth control pill, 0 the women's liberation
movement,'1 and the general increase in ecological conscience regarding the
world population 2 problem also contributed to the increase.
The United States, like most countries, faces the problem of overpopulation."1 The problem is of such magnitude that some commentators have
suggested the possibility of mandatory birth control. 14 However, the consensus is that such controls would be unconstitutional" and, even if lawful,
should not be implemented until all voluntary means are exhausted. 6 Because of its increasing popularity, voluntary sterilization may well be the
method of birth control needed to solve the problem without creating a constitutional crisis. It is a more effective method than either birth control pills or
intrauterine devices without harmful physiological side effects.' 7 Furthermore,
no intelligence or motivation is required for its use.' 8
Voluntary contraceptive sterilization is not without legal difficulties, however. The physician's liability, both criminal and civil, has not been adequately clarified. Moreover, the availability and nature of procedures for attaining
contraceptive sterilization poses a constitutional question involving the right
to privacy. Only four states have attempted to explicate these problems
through legislation. 9 (Florida has no statute.) This statutory vacuum has
relegated the question of liability to the doctor and his attorney,2' and the
question of procedure to each individual hospital. The effect in Florida has
been frightened doctors2" and the anomalous situation that contraceptive steri-

Voluntary Sterilization and the Medical Profession, 71 N.Y. ST. J. MEDIcINE 483 (1971);
Forbes, Voluntary Sterilization of Women as a Right, 18 Dz PAUL L. REv. 560 (1969); Gonzales, supra note 5, at 2582.
10. R. KiasNFr, THE PILL 63-126 (1969).
11. See generally The Crucial Math of Motherhood, LIFE, May 19, 1972, at 47.
12. See generally Friedrich, Population Explosion: Is Man Really Doomed?, Tniz, Sept.
13, 1971, at 58-59.
13. L. AuGUSrEIN, COME, LET Us PLAy GotD 54 (1959). The United States growth rate
is 1%. Id. at 55. The average yearly increase in population throughout the world is 2%.
If we continue to increase at this rate the world population will double by the year 2000.
14. See, e.g., Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and
Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 216-17.
15. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Vukowich, supra note 14, at 216-17.
16. See Blaustein, Arguendo: The Legal Challenge of Population Control, 3 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 107, 109 (1968); Friedman, Interference with Human Life: Some Jurisprudential
Reflections, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1058, 1069 (1970); Packwood, Incentives for the Two-Child
Family, 6 TRIAL 13 (1970); Pilpel, Family Planning and the Law, 18 SOCIL BIOLOGY s127,
s129 (Supp. 1971).
17. See notes 9, 10 supra and accompanying text.
18. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 78-80.
19. GA. CODE: ANN. §§84-931 to -935 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-271 (Supp. 1972),
§§90-374 to -375 (1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §435.305 (1972); VA. CODE ANN. §§32-423, -425 to
-427 (1969). See Vukowich, supra note 14, at 217.
20. See Wolf, Legal and PsychiatricAspects of Voluntary Sterilization, 3 J. FAMILY LAW
103, 118 (1963).
21. One urologist went into a panic when I requested one of his consent forms for a
vasectomy. Additionally, a resident in urology said he would never perform a vasectomy

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss2/5

2

1973]

McKenzie: Contraceptive
Sterilization: The Doctor, The Patient, and the Uni
CONTRACEPTIVE STERILIZATION

lization is available on request in some parts of the state22 and virtually un23
available in others.
This situation could be remedied through legislation that would authenticate and draw attention to sterilization as a viable and legitimate method of
contraception. Legislative publicity would hopefully encourage those who
could profit from sterilization to seek the operation. Furthermore, express
statutory authorization would also alleviate the physician's fear of liability
and thereby make sterilization procedures more available. 24 In order to propose model legislation this note will examine the physician's criminal and
civil liability and evaluate statutory treatment by other jurisdictions.
PHysicuN's

CRIMINAL LIAuiiTy

Only Utah25 specifically outlaws sterilizations performed solely for contraceptive purposes. Many commentators, however, have discussed the possibility
of criminal liability for such operations pursuant to applicable mayhem and
assault and battery statutes. 26 Although no doctor in the United States has
been convicted of a crime for performing a sterilization operation,27 the fear of
prosecution for mayhem or assault and battery still remains.28
Mayhem
Mayhem at common law was a crime of malicious maiming, rendering a
person unable to defend himself or to fight for the King.29 Mayhem is now
a statutory crime and in most states is defined only in terms of malicious
maiming.30

because the risk of suit was too high. For more general attitudes, see G. WLAMs, supra
note 9, at 102-03; Fort, Abortion and Sterilization: An Insight into Obstetrician-Gynecologist? Attitudes and Practices, 18 SocIAL BIOLOGY 192 (1971).
22. See Appendix B.
23. Id.
24. See generally Pilpel, supra note 16, at s131.
25. UTAH CoDE ANN. §64-10-12 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Campbell, Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortion and Sterilization in the
United States, 7 CLimCAL Oam-mrrcs & GYNEcoLoGY 22, 31-33 (1964); Miller & Dean, Liability
of Physicians for Sterilization Operations, 16 A.BA.J. 158, 159-60 (1930); Smith, Antecedent
Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery, 14 Rocy MVT. L. REv. 233, 276-81 (1942).
One commentator managed also to interject discussion of homicide. Miller & Dean, supra at
158.
27. Bravenec, Law and the Modification of Heredity Through DNA Chemistry, 8 J.
FAMmY

LAW 13, 20 (1968).

28. See G. WILuAMs, supra note 9, at 102-03; Pilpel, supra note 16, at s11. The number
of articles published in medical journals discussing the applicability of mayhem to voluntary
contraceptive sterilizations may also be indicative of the fear. E.g., Campbell, supra note
26, at 31-33. LaFollette, Attorney General's Opinion, Nontherapeutic Sterilization, 68 Wis.
MmicAt. J. 6 (1969); MacKay & Edey, The Law Concerning Voluntary Sterilization as it
Affects Doctors, 103 J. UROLOGY 482 (1970). See also Pilpel, supra note 16, at s130-31.
29. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 410, 133 S.W.2d 555 (1939).
30. Campbell, supra note 26, at 31; Miller & Dean, supra note 26, at 159; Smith,
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Malicious intent is the most important element of the crime 3' and must
be specifically proved.3 2 Consequently, the nature of the circumstances in the
33
sterilization context would probably negate the existence of such an intent.
Rather than maliciously ending the patient's reproductive potential, the
doctor is merely performing a simple medical operation as requested by the
34
patient.
The attorney general of Wisconsin, in a comprehensive analysis of the
applicability of his state's mayhem statute to nontherapeutic sterilizations,
concluded:35
It is my opinion that, insofar as individual maliciousness is concerned, the "intent to disable or disfigure another" is lacking in a
voluntary sterilization operation. Not only is the element of malice
lacking, but it is highly questionable whether the disabling element is
present when the "disabling" is the very end result rationally desired
by the patient.
Additionally, two cases have reached basically the same conclusion." 6
Since mayhem statutes were fashioned to punish acts of malicious maiming
it would be unreasonable to read those statutes as including within their
purview the surgical procedures of vasectomy and salpingectomy. Neither
operation constitutes an action taken "with malicious intent to maim or dis37
figure . . . or [disable] . .. a member of any other person."

Assault and Battery
Although mayhem does not envelope contraceptive sterilization procedures, assault and battery is more likely to give rise to criminal liability. Five
Florida statutes 38 set the penalties for assaults and batteries, but the criminal
elements are still determined by case law. The Florida courts have defined the
crime of "assault" as an unlawful offer or attempt to injure another with
apparent present ability to effectuate the offer under circumstances creating

supra note 26, at 277. For an example of such a statute see FLA. STAT. §784.01 (1971).
31. Smith v. State, 87 Fla. 502, 100 So. 738 (1924).
32. ld.
33. See LaFollette, supra note 28, at 6-7.
34. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 106-07; Campbell, supra note 26, at 32.
35. LaFollette, supra note 28, at 7. Professor Glanville Williams also remarked: "Human
beings are usually the best judges of their own interest, and if they consent to damage,
there is generally no reason why the law should protect them further. Ritual circumcisions,
for example, or skin-grafting or face-lifting operations may be undertaken for reasons
of tradition or superstition or vanity, as the case may be, and they undoubtedly produce
discomfort; yet it would be absurd to hold them unlawful." G. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 106.
36. Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (3d Dist. 1969);
Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 125, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934); G. WIAMS, supra
note 9, at 106.
37. FA. STAT. §784.01 (1971).
38. FLA. STAT. §§784.02-.06 (1971).
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a fear of imminent peril. 39 "Battery" has been defined as the unlawful touching or striking of, or the use of force against the person of another with
intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or apprehension
thereof.4o

Since consent is a bar to an assault and battery prosecution4i and is required before any surgical operation, the question of what constitutes effectual consent is determinative of liability. If the operation sufficiently transgresses the boundaries of public policy, however, the consent of the patient
may be vitiated. 42 Where the consent is vitiated the operation amounts to an
illicit touching-a battery. 43 Courts in California,4 4 Pennsylvania,4 5 and
Washington4 6 have held that a contraceptive sterilization operation performed
with the patient's consent is not contrary to the public interest. A Florida
appellate court has also accepted this view and ruled that "[a] contract to
47
perform an operation sterilizing the patient is not contrary to public policy."
Furthermore, public policy is usually expressed through legislative enactments or court decisions attempting to gauge public sentiment. A recent nationwide public opinion poll conducted for the United States Commission on
Population Growth and the American Future4 revealed that eight in ten
people favored the availability of voluntary sterilization on request. 49 Moreover, it would seem incongruous to contend that sterilization is contrary to
public policy when the federal government has authorized, through the Office
of Economic Opportunity, the expenditure of family planning funds to
finance the cost of sterilizations for indigents. 50
Nevertheless, although most commentators conclude that a criminal assault and battery prosecution would not lie, the possibility lingers. While
a Florida district court of appeal has ruled that a contract to perform a

39. Motley v. State, 155 Ila. 545, 549, 20 So. 2d 798, 800 (1945).
40. O'Brien v. Howell, 92 So. 2d 608, 610 (Fla. 1952); cf. Coswick v. State, 143 So. 2d 817,
820 (Fla. 1962).
41. Moreland v. State, 125 Ark. 24, 188 S.W. 1 (1916); State v. Archer, 22 S.D. 137, 115
N.W. 1075 (1908).
42. Cf. People v. Gibson, 232 N.Y. 458, 134 N.E. 531 (1921). See generally Shaheen v.
Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County, Pa. 1957); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247,
391 P.2d 201 (1964). See also G. W AiiMs,
supra note 9, at 103.
43. Donald v. Swann, 24 Ala. App. 463, 137 So. 178, cert. denied, 223 Ala. 493, 137 So.
181 (1931); Rogers v. Sells, 198 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936). See also G. WmILLMs, Supra
note 9, at 103.
44. Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (3d Dist. 1969);
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st Dist. 1967).
45. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County, Pa. 1957).
46. Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
47. Jackson v. Anderson, 280 So. 2d 503 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
48. The poll was conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, New
Jersey. Lipson & Wolman, Polling Americans on Birth Control and Population, 4 FAMILY
PLANNING PERSPECIVE 39

(1972).

49. Id. at 40.
50. O.E.O. Instruction 6180-1, May 18, 1971, 3 CCH URBAN
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sterilization operation is not contrary to public policy,51 the Florida Legislature has not so stated.
Statutory Relief
As stressed above, doctors retain at least an uneasiness if not an outright
fear regarding prosecutions for mayhem and assault and battery. 52 The conflict among commentators as to the likelihood of prosecution53 and the dearth
of case law and statutory explication only complicates the physicians' uneasiness.
However, a carefully drawn statute can easily remedy this unwarranted ambiguity.54 The statute proposed by this note would explicitly proscribe any
criminal liability of physicians performing sterilization operations in conformity with the outlined procedures. 55 Such legislative relief would free doctors from fear that could cloud good medical judgment.
CIVIL LIABILITY

Fear of civil liability for performing a sterilization operation is a more
realistic anxiety plaguing physicians, and has a profound effect on their
attitudes and procedures regarding sterilization. 56 One medical commentator
57
concluded:
The trend for the public to falsely assume that physicians are financially
sound, heavily insured and would travel to extremes to avoid publicity,
brightens the temptation to institute suit. The physician would be well
advised to abandon the procedure [in this case, vasectomy] entirely except for legally authorized eugenic reasons and specific therapeutic
indications.
Although the legal department of the American Medical Association has
stated there is no more risk of suit with a sterilization operation than with
any other surgical procedure,58 the fear of suit remains. Civil liability could
be based on negligence, breach of contract, or possibly on mayhem or assault
and battery.

51.

Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1970).

52.
53.
54.

See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
Compare Smith, supra note 26, at 276-84, with Campbell, supra note 26, at 31-33.
See Wolf, Legal and Psychiatric Aspects of Voluntary Sterilization, 3 J. FAMILY LAw

103, 118 (1963).
55. See Appendix A §1.03.
56. See Edey, supra note 9, at 483.
57. Reiser, Vasectomy: Medical and Legal Aspects, 79 J. UROLOGY 138, 143 (1958).
58. See Edey, supra note 9, at 483.
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Negligence
Negligence is the most common basis for proceeding against a physician
in a malpractice action.59 The law requires that a doctor treat his patients with
the same degree of care and skill as is exercised by physicians in the same or
comparable communities. 60 This obligation is one arising from the doctorpatient relationship and is not founded upon contract. 61
In the sterilization context, negligence could conceivably be predicated
on three distinct breaches of duty. First, the surgery itself could be negligently
performed. This fact would be most difficult to prove, since in both male and
female procedures the area operated upon is fully concealed. Therefore,
failure would probably not be known until a pregnancy occurs. Since there
is a possibility that spontaneous recanalization can occur,62 the doctrine of res
ipsa loquiturwould probably not be available to establish negligence.63 Consequently, negligence can only be proved by undergoing another operation. In
Bishop v. Byrne,6 4 for example, a subsequent operation revealed that one
Fallopian tube was intact indicating the probability of negligence because of
the physician's oversight. 65
Second, the physician might be negligent in failing to perform post-operative testing following a vasectomy. This situation arose in Christensen v.
Thornby66 and Ball v. Mudge.- In Ball it was disputed whether the standard
of practice in Seattle in 1964 made post-operative testing mandatory. Since the
plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proving that the standard included
testing, the court denied recovery.68
Today, however, a plaintiff would have less difficulty in proving that
post-operative testing is standard practice after a vasectomy. Most jurisdictions
determine the standard of practice by using the "similar community" rule6g
59. See, e.g., Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1967); Cook v. Lichtblau,
144 So. 2d 312, 316 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1962).
60. See Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964); Sinz v. Owens, 205 P.2d 3 (1949);
Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1956); Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 812,
316 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962). W. PROSSER, ToRTs §32, at 164 (4th ed. 1971).
61. Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
62. Recanalization is the regrowth of the tubes. The rate of such recanalization is 2
to 4%. Davis, Vasectomy, 72 AM. J. NURsING 509 (1972). See also Chaser, Male Sterilization,
87 J. UROLOGY 512, 515-16 (1962); Donnelly & Ferber, The Legal and Medical Aspects of
Vasectomy, 81 J. UROLOGY 259, 263 (1959); Rieser, Vasectomy: Medical and Legal Aspects,
79 J. UROLOGY 138 (1958).
63. Res ipsa locquiter, the thing speaks for itself, is applicable only in cases where the
event is of the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence. W. PnossER,
supra note 60, §39, at 214. Since it would be just as likely that recanalization had occurred
as negligence in the case of an ineffectual sterilization, res ipsa would probably not be
applicable. Cf. Hutsell v. Edens, 172 Neb. 592, 111 N.W.2d 388 (1961).
64. 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967).
65. Id. at 464.
66. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
67. 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
68. Id. at 203.
69. Florida apparently follows this rule. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla.
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rather than the "locality rule" applied in Ball. This change, coupled with
the prolificacy of medical literature indicating it would be patently unreasonable for a doctor to fail to conduct post-operative testing,70 would simplify
proving that testing is an integral part of the standard of care in vasectomy
cases.
Third, the doctor could be negligent in failing to sufficiently inform the
patient of the consequences and risks of the operation. The patient should
be informed of the relative finality of the operation 7 1 and alternative methods
of birth control.72 Failure to provide such information could render the physician liable because the patient could persuasively argue that he was unable
73
to give his "informed consent" to the surgery.
74
The proposed statute is not intended to relieve a doctor from liability
for negligence, but rather to explicitly inform him of certain procedures
required to avoid certain aspects of negligence liability. The statute requires
that the patient be fully informed of the nature and consequence of, and
alternatives to sterilization.75 Additionally, in the case of vasectomy, it requires post-operative testing to determine if and when the sperm has dis7
appeared from the semen.

6

Breach of Warranty
More intriguing and unusual in the medical setting is an action for breach
of warranty. No warranty will be implied for medical treatment, since the
physician does not insure the success of his treatment. 7 Hence, for a warranty

to arise the physician must expressly guarantee the success of the sterilization
operation.
The early cases in which plaintiffs sued for breach of warranty did not
recognize a right of recovery. In Christensen v. Thornby,7 8 the first reported
case involving a voluntary sterilization operation, a male patient had undergone a vasectomy in response to the physician's advice that it would be
dangerous for the patient's wife to bear another child. Relying upon the
physician's representations that the operation had been successful the
patient resumed sexual relations with his wife. Subsequently, the wife became
pregnant and without complications gave birth to a normal child. The
patient brought an action alleging breach of an express warranty seeking

1956); Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312, 316 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
70. E.g., Davis, supra note 62, at 2581-82; Donnelly & Ferber, supra note 62, at 263.
71. See Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963). See also text accompanying note 62 supra.
72. See Russell v. Harwick, 166 So. 2d 904 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Note, Sterilization
and Family Planning: The Physician's Civil Liability, 56 GEo. L.J. 976, 987 (1968).
73. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 60, §§18, 32, at 105, 165-66.
74. See Appendix A.
75. Id. §1.01.
76. Id. §1.02.
77. Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
78. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
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recovery for his anxiety and expenses. 79 On appeal the Minnesota supreme
court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover under warranty theory, since
it was a "matter of common knowledge that such an operation properly done
in due course effects sterilization" and any competent surgeon would have
given the plaintiff similar advice.80 The court also noted that the operation's
primary purpose was to save the wife from the hazards incident to pregnancy
and delivery. Instead of losing his wife, said the court, the plaintiff "has been
blessed with the fatherhood of another child. The expenses alleged [were]
incident to the bearing of a child, and their avoidance is remote from the
avowed purpose of the operation."' 1
In Shaheen v. Knight8 2 a Pennsylvania court carried this "blessing concept" even further by denying recovery in a suit for breach of express warranty involving an ineffectual sterilization performed for family planning purposes. Although the court apparently found that a breach of warranty had
occurred, it denied recovery on the ground:8 3
To allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that the physician would have to pay for the fun, joy and affection which plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and educating of this defendant's
[sic] fifth child.
The Florida position, however, is that recovery will be allowed if a warranty and breach thereof can be proved.84 In Vilord v. Jenkins-s the plaintiff
had undergone a sterilization operation and later became pregnant and gave
birth to a normal, healthy child. The complaint alleged that the doctor
had represented to the husband and wife that the operation would render the
wife barren. On appeal from the trial court's granting of the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the appellate court ruled that such a representation would amount to a warranty and, if the plaintiffs could prove the
8
alleged facts, recovery for breach of warranty would be allowed.

79. Id.

80. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
81.

Id.

82. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County, Pa. 1957).
83. Id. at 45-46. Other courts have taken what appears to be a more reasonable approach
by classifying the factors listed by the Shaheen court as damage mitigating rather than
allowing them to defeat the entire cause of action. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 503, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (2d Dist. 1967); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1970). The Custodio court in the process remarked of the adoption alternative
mentioned by the Shaheen court: "It is not consistent with the very stability of the family
which the same court relies on to support its views of 'universal public sentiment." 251
Cal. App. 2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (2d Dist. 1967). The Jackson court also remarked:
"This child is not to be thought of as unwanted or unloved, but as unplanned." 230 So.
2d at 503 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
84. Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).

85. 226 So. 2d 245 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
86. Id. at 247.
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In Jackson v. Anderson87 the same court, in response to the "blessing" argument by the defendant physician, stated: 88
If the appellee's [physician's] contention is correct it results in an anomalous situation. It is uncontroverted that prior to the normal delivery
of child an action would lie.... Should plaintiffs in this situation file
immediately and push for final hearing before delivery? . . . Should
we recognize a cause of action defeasible upon the happening of a
condition subsequent?... We have no way of telling what damages the
jury will assess, but if the plaintiffs' can prove their case the jury is entitled to assess them.
Justice demands that if the physician represents unequivocally that the
operation will result in sterility he should pay whatever damages the plaintiff
can prove if the operation fails. Most physicians, however, would not make
such unqualified representations.8 9 Furthermore, a well drafted consent form
that is understood and signed by the patient would avoid such liability. 90
However, the possibility exists that the patient might misunderstand the
physician's explanation of the operation as a guarantee. For instance, in the
explanation of the normal permanence of the procedure the patient might
infer that the doctor is guaranteeing that the operation will result in permanent sterility 1 Therefore, explication within this area is definitely needed.
Accordingly, the proposed legislation would relieve physicians of liability
for suits based on breach of warranty.92 The explanation required in section
1.01 would include a revelation of the possibility of spontaneous recanalization and the approximate rate of such failures. 93 Furthermore, actions for
breach of warranty would be proscribed by section 1.03.
Civil Liability for CriminalOffenses
Suits based on civil liability for mayhem or assault and battery are potentially the most troublesome. For instance, if a sterilization procedure constitutes mayhem, some jurisdictions would allow recovery although the victim
94
had consented.
Assault and battery pose even greater threats to the physician. If public
policy vitiates the consent of the patient, the operation constitutes an assault
and battery and the patient can sue the doctor for damages. 95

87. 230 So. 2d 503 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
88.
89.

Id.
Hirsch, Legal Problems in Human Sterilization, 5 J. Miss. ST. MEDICAL ASS'N 49,

51 (1964).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See consent form attached as Appendix C.
See generally Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934).
See Appendix A § 1.03.
See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 60, §18, at 107-08.
See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 124, 255 N.W. 620, 621 (1934).
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Still more ambiguous and troublesome is the operation performed without
the spouse's consent. In Kritzer v. Citron-8 the wife, if not expressly, impliedily
agreed to undergo a sterilization operation. The husband did not consent or
object to the procedure.97 The couple subsequently brought suit against the
physician for assault and battery. The court held that the husband's consent
was not needed and that consent of the patient alone was sufficient. 98 Nevertheless, a Canadian court on similar facts held to the contrary: 99
As the relationship between a husband and wife is not only confidential, but is of the most intimate nature and is attended upon with such
far reaching consequences, I am of the opinion that anything that might
be done which would interfere with such a sacred relationship and
its consequences should be undertaken only with the consent of both
parties and after discussion with the parties and advising them upon the
consequences.
The argument usually made by proponents of this theory is that both
husband and wife have a mutual interest in each other's powers of procreation 00 and therefore the consent of both is needed to make the consent
of either efficacious. 1' 1 However, since only the individual patient need give
consent for such serious sterilizing surgery as a hysterectomy 102 or a prostatectomy,' 03 it seems totally inconsistent to require the spouse's consent for
a simple procedure such as a vasectomy or a salpingectomy merely because its
intent is to sterilize. Nevertheless, this area remains totally unsettled.
The proposed statute would relieve the physician from liability for
damages based on mayhem or assault and battery.104 The statute explicitly
states that the consent of the spouse is not required for a sterilization operation.05 The operation would thereby be placed back into the medical context rather than put in a special category because of its volatile moral and
religious connotation.0 8 Additionally, the individual would have the sole
responsibility of deciding whether to undergo sterilization.107
96. 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808 (2d Dist. 1950).
97. The facts were that both the husband and wife had consented to sterilization of
the wife incident to an anticipated delivery by Caeserean section. Mrs. Kritzer, however,
delivered the child normally. Thereafter, the doctor took her to the operating room absent
any objection on her part and apparently with her consent and performed the sterilization.
Id. at 37, 38, 224 P.2d at 810, 811.
98. Id. at 38, 224 P.2d at 811. Cf. Rosenburg v. Feigin, 119 Cal. App. 2d 783, 260 P.2d

195 (2d Dist. 1953).
99. The unreported decision is discussed in Comment, The Legal Aspects of Sterilization,
58 CANA~rAN MFDcCL ASS'N J. 512 (1948).
100. See Hirsch, supra note 89, at 51. Cf. Kreyling v. Kreyling, 23 A.2d 800 (Ct. Ch.

NJ. 1942).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808 (2d Dist. 1950).
Removal of the uterus.
Removal of the prostate gland.
Appendix A §1.03.
Id. §1.01.
See D. MEYERs, THm HUMAN BonY AND THE LAw 34 (1970).
See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Hospital Policy
In all but five states108 the availability of and procedures for voluntary con-

traceptive sterilization are determined by the rules and policies of the individual hospital. 10 9 Hospital rules and policies are normally established by
the medical staff.", Gynecologists and urologists usually establish the respective policies governing salpingectomy and vasectomy for in-hospital procedures."' Consequently, hospital policies are affected by the physicians' fear
of both civil and criminal liability.1 12 The result is that the policies are
conservative if not repressive, while the attitudes of the physicians are more
1
liberal. '

3

The effect of this anomalous situation in Florida has been to create a
climate in which access to sterilization procedures is controlled by such facts
as the number of children the patient has, his age, the locality in which
he lives, or whether the doctor involved can fabricate an "acceptable" medical

108. GA. CODE ANN. §§84-931 to -936 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§90-271 (Supp.
1972), 90-273 to -274 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. §435.350 (1972); VA. CODE ANN. §§32-423, -425
to -427 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §64-10-12 (1968).
109. See Edey, Voluntary Sterilization and the Medical Profession, 71 N.Y. ST. J. MmiCINE 483 (1971).
110. See Fort, Abortion and Sterilization: An Insight into Obstetrician-Gynecologists'
Attitudes and Practices, 18 SOCIAL BIOLOGY 192 (1971).
111. Id. See also Rieser, supra note 62, at 138-40.
112. See Edey, supra note 109, at 483. Hospital policies may also be somewhat affected
by physicians' fear of adverse psychological reactions caused by undergoing sterilization.
See, e.g., Wolf, Legal and Psychiatric Aspects of Voluntary Sterilization, 3 J. FAMILY LAw
103, 109-18 (1963). However, recent reports have discounted such fears and some commentators contend that the positive psychological effects far outweigh any negative reactions.
Grosswirth, Who's Afraid of Vasectomy?, SATURDAY REv., June 10, 1972, at 39-40. The fact
that the operation is potentially irreversible could also affect hospital policies. However,
surgical techniques of reversal are becoming more refined. According to which commentary
one reads, the reversal rate is from 50 to 80%. Some specialists in male reversal are
reporting up to 85% success in restoring sperm counts to normal levels. Nevertheless, reports indicate that of those males in which a normal sperm count is restored, only about
25% produce sperm capable of impregnation. See Davis, Vasectomy, 72 AM. J. NURSING 509
(1972); Gonzales, Voluntary Sterilization, 70 AM. J. NURSING 2581 (1970).
A new development in vasectomy technique is the use of a valve that can be opened or
closed by a simple surgical procedure. Davis, supra at 512. Additionally, the storing of
sperm in frozen sperm banks may be an answer to irreversibility objections to sterilization
of the male. Sperm can be stored at very minimal rates for up to 10 years in these banks.
If after undergoing a vasectomy a man decided he wanted to have a child, his wife could
be artificially inseminated with his sperm from a bank. This procedure could be performed
if attempts at reversal fail or if the man does not wish to submit to surgical reversal. Id.
at 513.
113. See Fort, supra note 110, at 193-94. A good example of the variance between
hospital policy and physician attitudes is that one-third of the doctors responding to a
recent survey felt that the sterilization policies of the hospitals

in which they practice

should be more liberal. Appendix B.
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reason. 114 A recent survey of seventeen Florida hospitals revealed that policies
vary widely, from sterilization on request to only therapeutic sterilization with
strict consultation requirements and committee approval, to no sterilization
at all."'l Without doubt the unsettled legal climate as to liability for sterilization has had a profound effect on hospital policy.11 6 The control over this
area should be taken from the physicians who are subject to such liability and
left to the individual, since birth control and procreation fall within the area
of fundamental rights. 17 Furthermore, sterilization procedures should be
standardized.
Existing Statutory Relief
A few states have sought to standardize sterilization procedures and remedy
the unnecessary ambiguities"" through statutes explicitly authorizing voluntary contraceptive sterilization and establishing required procedures." 9
20
In 1965 the Virginia Legislature was the first to enact such legislation.
2
The Virginia statute provides in part:' 1
It shall be lawful for any physician or surgeon licensed by this state and
acting in collaboration or consultation with at least one or more physicians or surgeons [to perform a vasectomy or salpingectomy on any
person of age].
This section of the statute alone is enough to remedy many of the uncertainties that plague the legal climate surrounding voluntary contraceptive
sterilization by pronouncing that such operations are not contrary to "public
policy."' 122 However, the statute also requires that the operation be performed
in a licensed hospital 23 after a full and reasonable medical explanation of
the meaning and consequence of the operation is given the patient24 and
the patient's spouse has consented. In addition, the statute dictates a thirty-day

114. Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
See Edey, supra note 109, at 485. See also note 113 supra and accompanying text.
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.. 438 (1972).
See text accompanying notes 25-91 supra.
119. GA. CODE ANN. §§84-931 to -936 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§90-271 (Supp.
1972), 90-274 to -274 (1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §435.350 (1972); VA. CODE ANN. §§32-423, -425

to -427 (1969).
120. VA. CODE ANN. §§32-423, -425 to 427 (1969). The Georgia and North Carolina
statutes were patterned after the Virginia statute. GA. CODE ANN. §§84-931 to -936 (Supp.
1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-271 (Supp. 1972), 90-273 to -274 (1971). The Oregon legislation
is more liberal but less explicit as to procedures.
121. VA. CODE ANN. §32-423 (1969). The Georgia and North Carolina statutes are almost
identical to the Virginia statute. Therefore, the analysis of the Virginia statute- is equally
applicable to the two other statutes.
122. See notes 42-52 supra and accompanying text.
123. VA. CODE ANN. §32-423 (1969).
124.

Id.
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waiting period between the request and the operation. 1 25 Finally, the statute
contains a section that exculpates physicians performing operations pursuant
to the statute from criminal and civil liability in the absence of negligence. 12
The effect is to allow the patient to determine whether he wants or needs the
operation and to relieve the physician of the responsibility of discerning
what is legally necessary by outlining exact procedures.
While the proposed statute adopts the Virginia approach by expressly
removing the physicians' liability127 the Virginia procedures have been further
refined. The proposed statute abandons the irrational consultation requirement.128 Since no requirement of medical indication is prescribed in the Virginia statute, no medical collaboration is needed. Rather, the consulting doctor
can only serve to document that a sterilization has been requested. As one
physician-commentator concluded: 129

[T]hose adults who seek . . . [sterilization] are almost always in the
best position to make a rational decision. The next best judge is their
own physician. Anyone else involved in the decision is more likely to
be dealing with his own personal prejudices or preconceived notions
than with the human problems of those who must live with the consequences of his decisions.
Additionally, the Virginia statute 3 0 provides no procedures to follow
should the attending physician and consultant disagree. If the statute required
agreement the attending physician would probably search for a more agreeable
consultant after disagreement with the original consultant."' l In effect, the
consultation requirement serves only to increase the cost of the operation 32
and to assuage the objections of a few legislators who think they are medical
experts or who have moral or religious objections to sterilization per se.133
The proposed statute also eliminates the requirement that the operation
be performed in a licensed hospital. 34 Vasectomies are already widely performed in the physician's office13 5 and tubal sterilizations of women are being
increasingly performed on an outpatient basis.136 Additionally, refinements
in technique may soon render office sterilization of women a reality37 There-

125. Id. §32-425.
126. Id. §32-426.
127. See Appendix A §1.03.
128. Id. §1.01.
129. Rattan, The Case for Voluntary Sterilization, 69 Wis. MEDICAL J. 20, 21 (1970).
130. VA. CODE ANN. §32-423 (1969).
131. The statute only expressly requires that consultation occur and is silent as to
whether the two doctors must agree. Id.
132. The patient usually has to pay the consulting doctor as well as the attending
physician.
133. Cf. DeLee, Voluntary Sterilization, 54 INTERNATIONAL SURGERY 304, 306-07 (1970).
134. Appendix A §1.01.
135. See Davis, Vasectomy, 72 AM. J. NURSING 509 (1972).
136. See text in note 4 supra.
137. Id.
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fore, by retaining the requirement that the procedure be performed by a
licensed physician, 138 but eliminating the in-hospital necessity, the safety of
the procedure can be relatively guaranteed at the lowest cost to the individual.

Also eliminated by the proposed statute is the necessity of obtaining the
spouse's consent.' 3 9 Such a requirement sets simple sterilization procedures
apart from the other medical procedures to which an individual can consent
without the spouse's acquiescence. Such differing treatment is not warranted
morally, medically, or legally.40
Moreover, requiring the spouse's consent could create more liability problems for the doctor. For instance, X comes into Dr. D's office representing
that he is single and requesting a vasectomy. Dr. D follows the statutory mandates and at a later date performs the operation, which is successful. Arguably,
X's wife would have a valid cause of action based on D's failure to comply
with the statute. Most importantly, however, requiring the spouse's consent is
an unneeded legislative intrusion into the family relationship. The agreement
of spouses should be a matter of family privacy and not a legislative dictate.
Individuals, although married, should still have the right to control their
procreational functions.' 4 1

The final difference in the proposed statute is that the waiting period
has been reduced from thirty to fifteen days.14 2 Most studies have shown that
only about two per cent of people who have voluntarily undergone sterilization regret the decision.'- 3 Since relatively few change their minds fifteen days
should be a sufficient period to insure that the decision has not been made
hastily.
Oregon also statutorily authorizes voluntary contraceptive sterilization.44
The statute apparently requires only the consent of the patient for sterilization.
Nevertheless, the statute is sufficiently general to allow hospitals to continue
to add other requirements. However, the proposed statute 45 leaves hospitals
no discretionary authority to set additional conditions. The hospital must
follow the procedures established by the statute.
Statutory authorization and explication are definitely needed in the area
of voluntary sterilization. 46 Nevertheless, the legislation must establish ra-

188. Appendix A §1.01.
139. Id.
140. See text accompanying notes 102-103 supra. See also Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App.
2d 83, 224 P.2d 808 (2d Dist. 1950); Pilpel, Family Planning and the Law, 18 SocAL
BioLorGY s127, s131 (Supp. 1971).

141. See text accompanying note 161 infra.
142. Appendix A §1.01.
148. Edey, supra note 109, at 483.
144. OR. REV. STAT. §534.305 (1972).
145. See Appendix A.
146. See Edey, supra note 109, at 483; Wolf, Legal and PsychiatricAspects of Voluntary
Sterilization,3 J. FAMILY LAW 103, 115 (1963).
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tional procedures. The proposed statute' 47 is an attempt to balance medical
and social safeguards against the rights of the individuals involved.
SterilizationProceduresand the Constitution
Although there are many practical and medical reasons for eliminating
such requirements as consultation, sterilization committees, and spouse's consent from hospital policy and authorizing statutes, 148 these requirements may
also be constitutionally objectionable. Recent decisions involving the right
of privacy 49 may invalidate such restrictions on the individual's control over
decisions involving procreation.150
The constitutional right of privacy is a relatively new legal concept
spawned by the United States Supreme Court decision of Griswold v. Connecticut'1' in 1965.152 Nevertheless, the concept had been developing for some
time. 53 In 1923 the Court stated that the fourteenth amendment not only
granted citizens freedom from bodily restraint but also protected the right
"to marry, establish a home and bring up children."' 54 Nearly twenty years
later in Skinner v. Oklahoma 55 the Court overturned a compulsory sterilization statute on the ground that the right to procreate is one of the basic
liberties and civil rights of man. 58 More recently in Griswold the Supreme
Court held that the marital relationship fell "within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees" and thus was
57
not subject to unjustified governmental invasion.1
Since Griswold two lower federal courts5 s and one state supreme court 5 9
have extended the right of privacy to include the right of the individual to
control his destiny in matters of sex and procreation without unwarranted
governmental intrusion. Most recently the Supreme Court, in Eisenstadt v.

147. See Appendix A.
148. See text accompanying notes 123-146 supra.
149. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293
(E.D. Wis. 1970); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969); People v. Belous,
71 Cal. 2954, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
150. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
151. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
152. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MtcH. L. REv. 219 (1965).
153.

Doss 9c Doss, On Morals, Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 395

(1971).
154. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Supreme Court had previously
declared, in the late 19th century, that the fourth and fifth amendments protected "the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" from governmental intrusion. Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
155. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
156. Id. at 541.
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
158. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970); United States v. Vuitch,
305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
159. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915
(1970).
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Baird1 60 extended the constitutional right of privacy to include unmarried
individuals. Speaking for the majority Mr. Justice Brennan stated:1 61
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals, each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.
Therefore, to intrude within the area of a person's "decision whether to
bear or beget a child" the state must have a compelling interest. 6 2 "Matters
have certainly reached a point where a sound, informed interest of the state
must affirmatively appear before the state infringes unduly on such rights."'168
It is doubtful that consultation as required by three sterilization statutes 6 4
and many hospitals serves any "sound informed interest of the state."' 6 5
Furthermore, the right of individual privacy might also invalidate the
1 7
66
requirement of the spouse's consent as found in the Virginia,' Georgia, 6
68
statutes and the majority of the hospitals surveyed. 6 9
and North Carolina
As the Court in Eisenstadt stated:7 0
mhe marital couple is not an independent entity.., but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
make-up. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual,married or single ....
To allow one spouse to exercise control over the other spouse's decision
whether to be sterilized appears totally inconsistent with the Eisenstadt extension of the right of privacy, especially when such a right is granted the
controlling spouse by the state.
The provisions of the three state statutes' 7 ' could easily be challenged on
fourteenth amendment due process grounds. However, suits challenging hospital procedures would be dependent upon establishing that the action of

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

405 US. 438 (1972).
Id. at 453.
See 405 U.S. at 447 n.7 (1972).
United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969).
GA. CODE ANN. §84-931 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-271

VA. CODE ANN.

§32-423

(Supp. 1972);

(1969).

165.

United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969).

166.
167.

VA. CODE ANN. §32-423 (1969).
GA. CODE ANN. §84-931 (Supp. 1972).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-271 (Supp. 1972).

168.
169. See Appendix B.
170. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
171. GA. CODE ANN. §84-931 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-271 (Supp. 1972); VA.
CODE ANN. §32-423 (1969).
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the hospital constituted "state action."172 When the hospitals are operated by
governmental entities the obvious presence of state action requires conformity
to constitutional mandates. 173 However, the general rule is that private
hospitals are not bound by constitutional provisions that require "state
74
action."
Nevertheless, few, if any, hospitals today fall within the purely private
hospital classification, since "state action" has been broadened to include many
activities in which private action is insinuated with such governmental activity
as regulation, financing, and tax exemptions. 75 The court in Citta v. Delaware
Hospitali6held that the receipt of federal funds carries with it the obligation
to observe federal constitutional mandates. The Citta decision was pursuant
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding early in Simkins v. Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital177 that state action in the broad sense, including
federal, encompassed action by parties involved in federally funded programs.' s The plaintiffs in that case had challenged the discriminatory practice of the defendant hospital in regard to staff privileges and patient admis7 9
sion. The court ruled:
[W]e find it significant here that the defendant hospitals operate as
integral parts of comprehensive joint or intermeshing state and federal
plans or programs designed to effect a proper allocation of available
medical and hospital resources for the best possible promotion and
maintenance of public health. Such involvement in discriminatory
action "it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn."
Additionally, financial involvement of the state or federal government,
or both, in the nature of medicare, medicaid, or other grants or payments
may so impress a hospital with governmental aegis as to render it amenable
to constitutional guarantees. However, in West Coast Hospital Association v.
8 0
Hoare'
the Florida supreme court found that such minimal governmental
involvement as payments from the city amounting to only one per cent of
the operating budget and one per cent of the cost of certain expansion, and
the payment of bills by the county for treatment of indigents was not enough
to render a hospital operated by a private non-profit corporation a public
hospital. The court found that the hospital need not furnish due process.'Bl
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington

172. See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
173. Crapps v. Duval County Hosp. Authority, 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
174. West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953).
175. For instance, many hospitals have received funds for construction through the
Hill-Burton Act. 42 U.S.C. §291 (1970).
176. 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
177. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
178. Id. at 967.
179. Id. at 967-68.
180. 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953).
181. Id. at 299.
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Parking Authority' 82 seems to have cast grave doubts on the validity of
West Coast Hospital as precedent. In Burton the city had built a parking
facility with public funds and leased a portion of the building to a restaurant.
In the process of holding the restaurant's refusal to serve blacks to be unconstitutional the Supreme Court found that even though the business itself
was not publicly funded, it was sufficiently benefited by the expenditures of
public funds that its action was "state action."183 The Court attached major
significance to "the obvious fact that the restaurant [was] operated as an
integral part of a public building."1""
Furthermore, an accumulation of governmental involvement has been
found to taint seemingly private hospitals with such an impression of "a
public interest as to render them instrumentalities of government, and thus
within the reach of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution."18 5 In Eaton v. Grubbs'8 6 the Fourth Circuit ruled that the cumulative
impact of federal, state, and local participation in construction costs; donation of the land by the city; 87 the existence of state licensing involving minute
regulation of the day-to-day operation of the hospital; and a federal and state
tax exemption 88 was enough to constitute a sufficient insinuation of the state
to require the hospital to abide by constitutional mandates. 8 9 In Florida,
hospitals receive substantial amounts of money through medicaid and medicare payments and often through local governmental grants or public donations. Additionally, the Florida statutes' 90 provide for minute regulations
of the operation of hospitals. Finally, non-profit hospitals are eligible for tax
exempt status.' 9 '
If any hospitals do not fall within the aforementioned categories delineated
by the federal courts, Florida has a theory of quasi-public institutions that
would probably encompass every hospital within the state, even those without
any visible state connection. In litigation involving a private professional
92
organization the Florida supreme court held:'
It is dear that not all private associations must observe due process
standards. However, such standards must be observed when a private
association becomes quasi-public, assumes a public purpose of its own,
incorporates and seeks the tax shelters and other protections of public

182. 365 US. 715 (1961).

183. Id. at 724.
184. Id.
185. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 965-66 (4th Cir. 1963).
186. 329 F.2d 710, 714 (4th Cir. 1964).
187. Donation of the land alone may be sufficient to color the action as that of the
state. Cf. Smith v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964).
188. The granting of tax exemption, which operated as an aid to discrimination in
education, has been ruled unconstitutional. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (DJD.C.
1969), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
189. 329 F.2d 710, 717 (4th Cir. 1964).
190. See FLA. STAT. §395.07 (1971). See also FLA. ADMiN. CODE ch. 1OD-28.
191. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE oF 1954 §501 (c) (3).
192. McCune v. Wilson, 237 So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 1970).
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law, or otherwise assumes a larger purpose or stature than pleasant,
friendly and congenial social relationships.
Hospitals, even totally private ones, serve a public purpose of maintaining
the public health and, as such, are quasi-public 93 serving a governmental
function.194 Although the court in McCune never specifically mentions the
fourteenth amendment, the presence of the due process language and the
characterization of entities as "quasi-public" gives rise to an unmistakable
inference that the constitutional provision is being applied.
With the growth and importance of hospitals coupled with the presence
of tremendous amounts of governmental involvement through funding and
regulation, it appears likely that all hospitals will be required to abide by
constitutional mandates. Hospitals often hold the key to procedures having
great impact on individuals' lives. 195 Therefore, no hospital should be allowed
to bury within anachronistic procedures individuals' access to operations such
as sterilization. To intrude within an area so central to our fundamental ideals
of freedom as the right to decide whether to procreate, a hospital should be
required to have some overriding and compelling interest at stake.1 96
Suits against hospitals for not allowing sterilization operations would
probably be more successful than those by persons who have been unsuccessfully sterilized. Not only could the suits seek to invalidate such requirements
as consultation and spouses' consent, but also the courts might entertain
actions for damages under section 1983, title 42, of the United States Code for
violating constitutional rights of privacy. 97 Skillfully drawn legislation could
remedy these problems. The statute proposed by this note removes the constitutionally suspect requirements of consultation and spouses' consent. The
matter of sterilization is therefore left to the privacy of the individual patient
and his physician.
CONCLUSIONS

Control of population in this country and around the world is crucial.19s
Traditional methods of birth control have failed to check the increasing birth

193. Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 92 N.J. Super. 163, 168, 222 A.2d 530, 533 (1966),
aff'd, 95 N.J. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (1967).
194. See generally Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.

1963).
195. See Rattan, The Case for Voluntary Sterilization, 69 Wis. MEDICAL J. 20, 21 (1970).
196. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
197. Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) (emphasis added).
198. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
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rate for various reasons. 199 One commentator surveying the problem remarked:

200

There is a wide variety of birth control techniques available, yet for
some countries or ...

families the cost is too great, the I.Q. for their

use too low, the effectiveness too uncertain or the idea too unappealing.
For some people, those who feel their childbearing careers should be
definitely terminated, some permanent and irreversible method is desired. To them we can offer sterilization.
Sterilization procedures can only be effective if they are made readily
available. Consequently, the requirements of sterilization committees, medical
justification, and strict consultation required by many Florida hospitals for
sterilization operations are medical, social, and legal anachronisms that should
be abandoned. However, until physicians are relieved from fear of civil and
criminal liability, many rigorous limitations on the availability of sterilization
will continue. It is apparent that only legislation can accomplish the abolition
of these restrictions.
Such legislation should not infringe on individual and marital rights of
privacy. The statute proposed by this note would alleviate not only the
physician's fear of liability, but also would establish policies providing adequate safeguards to assure that the decision to be sterilized is one rationally
and informatively made. Yet, the procedures would not infringe upon the
individual's right of privacy.
It is time for sterilization to be recognized as a legitimate means of birth
control and removed from irrational moral and religious debate.201 The proposed statute accomplishes that goal.
JAMES F. McKExziE

199. See De Lee, supra note 133, at 308-09 (1970).
200. Id. at 304.
201. Id. at 306; Hirsch, Legal Problems in Human Sterilization, 5 J. Miss. ST. MamicAL

Ass'N 49, 50 (1964).
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APPENDIX A
PROPOSED STATUTE

§1.01 Authorization of Voluntary Contraceptive Sterilization-Any physician or surgeon
licensed in this state may perform an appropriate sterilization operation on any person
eighteen years of age or older, or less than eighteen years of age if legally married, upon
request by such person. The consent of the spouse of a married person is not required.
Prior to the operation, preferably at the time of the request, the attending physician must
give a full and reasonable medical explanation as to the meaning and consequences of the
operation to the patient. The operation shall not be performed less than fifteen days
after the request is made to the physician or surgeon.
§1.02 Vasectomy: Post-Operative Testing-In the performance of a vasectomy, the physician shall conduct sufficient post-operative testing to insure the operation's success.
§1.03 No Liability for Non-negligent Performance of the Operation-Subject to the
rules of law applicable generally to negligence, no physician or surgeon licensed by this
state shall be liable either civilly or criminally by reason of having performed a sterilization
operation authorized by this chapter.
§1.04 This Chapter Does Not Affect Therapeutic Sterilization-The procedures in this
chapter do not control sterilization operations performed for medical reasons. The
procedures for such therapeutic operations shall be controlled by sound medical practice.
APPENDIX B
SURVEY RESULTS*

This survey was conducted among a cross section of Florida gynecologists.'0
The
questionnaire was sent to 23 doctors with 15 responses covering 17 hospitals.
No sterilizations allowed: 1 hospital.
Therapeutic sterilizations with only approval by sterilization committee after consultation with spouse's consent required: 1 hospital.
Therapeutic sterilizations only with consultation and spouse's consent required: 1 hospital.
Any sterilizations but consultation and spouse's consent required: 5 hospitals male and
female; I hospital for male only.
Any sterilizations with only the spouse's consent required: 6 hospitals.
Any sterilization with only the patient's consent required: 2 hospitals male and female;
1 hospital for female only.
Three doctors practicing in hospitals requiring consultation felt that the requirement
should be abandoned, and two doctors practicing in hospitals requiring the spouse's
consent felt that the patient's consent should be all that is required.

*Compilation of the survey material is on file with the University of Florida Law Review.
**I wish to acknowledge the help of C. H. Gilliland, M.D. in conducting this survey.
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APPENDIX C
STruLZATON PERMIT

Date
I hereby request and authorize Doctor

Hour

a.m.
p.m.
and assistants

of his choice to perform the following operation
upon me at
(Hospital) (Clinic) (Office), and to perform any
other procedure that his (their) judgment may dictate during the above operation. It has
been explained to me that in all probability I will be sterile as a result of this operation,
but no such result has been warranted. I understand that the word "sterility" means that
I may be unable to conceive or bear children, and in giving my consent to the operation
I have in mind the probability of such a result.
Signed
Signature Witnessed:

By
By
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